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Abstract 
The environment has traditionally been the domain of nonprofit organizations. For decades, 
nonprofit organizations have worked to reduce the negative impact of market-based activity on the 
environment. However, more recently nonprofits have started to adopt the methods and values of 
the market to achieve sustainability goals. One of the primary strategies that nonprofits use is to 
disclose, or pressure corporations to disclose, information about the environmental impact of their 
products and processes. These information disclosure strategies seek to help stakeholders make 
green purchases or invest in corporations that use green practices, thus incentivizing corporations 
to reduce their negative environmental impact. In this chapter, we review the benefits and the 
challenges encountered by nonprofits in their attempt to use information disclosure strategies. 
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Introduction 
In the United States, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century 
saw the creation of several environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs).4 For 
example, the Sierra Club was founded in 1892, and the Audubon Society was founded in 1905. 
These NGOs launched important conservation campaigns and participated in the movement that 
led to the creation of the U.S. National Park Service in 1916. The 1970s saw the rise of NGOs 
that actively mobilize citizens to take action at the state and federal levels and urge policy 
makers to adopt and implement strong environmental protection policies. The Environmental 
Defense Fund was created in 1967, the Natural Resources Defense Council was formed in 1970, 
and Greenpeace was founded in 1971. The birth of these NGOs coincided with the passage of 
important environmental legislation, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act, as well as the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA). The regulatory framework that emerged from these developments allowed NGOs to 
lead the fight against industrial pollution by using litigation to press for enforcement. At the 
time, the relationship between companies and NGOs was typically one of tension and mutual 
distrust. 
However, since then some NGOs have radically changed their strategies (Kong et al. 2002). As 
Michael E. Kraft (2001:141) writes, “the role of NGOs in the United States has changed 
significantly over the past thirty years as environmental advocacy groups moved from a posture 
of confrontation and adversarial relations with government and industry to one characterized by 
professionalism and cooperation.” For example, NGOs now routinely engage in strategic 
collaborations with corporations to help them reduce their environmental impact (Rondinelli and 
London 2003). A notable example of this trend is the collaboration between McDonald’s and the 
Environmental Defense Fund to develop more sustainable packaging (Peloza and Falkenberg 
2009). This collaboration drew on complementary expertise from both the private sector and the 
nonprofit world to reduce the environmental footprint of packaging for McDonald’s sandwiches. 
                                                 
4 This chapter uses Kerstin Martens’s (2002) definition of NGO: “NGOs are formal (professionalized) independent 
societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international 
level.”Page 282.  
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NGOs are also increasing their use of information disclosure strategies as a low-cost way to exert 
market and legal pressure on companies. These strategies aim to inform consumers, investors, 
and other NGOs about the environmental attributes of products or processes in order to help 
these stakeholders make more-responsible market decisions. Some approaches, such as those 
pursued by confrontational NGOs such as Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network (RAN) 
(Lyon 2012), emphasize the “naming and shaming” of heavy polluters. Other approaches set 
environmental performance standards and certify their achievement, often with support from 
third-party certification entities (Delmas and Colgan 2018). Perhaps the most prominent example 
of this strategy is the attempt by nonprofit organizations to influence consumptions patterns 
through the development of product eco-labels (Fischer and Lyon 2014). 
NGOs use information disclosure strategies not only to promote green products but also to 
promote green practices within companies. They use investing tactics, such as shareholder 
resolutions (Graves,  Waddock, and Rehbein 2001) and socially responsible investments (Guay, 
Doh, and Sinclair 2004; Delmas, Etzion, and Nairn-Birch 2013), to encourage or pressure 
corporations to increase their transparency and to become more environmentally sustainable. In 
addition, nonprofit organizations are increasingly using information disclosure strategies to 
support the creation of hybrid models (Delmas and Young 2009; Boyd et al. 2017) or “atypical” 
organizational forms (Brés, Raufflet, and Boghossian 2018) that incorporate approaches and 
values of the for-profit marketplace. For example, the B Corporation is a certification created by 
B Lab, a 501(c) nonprofit. B Lab awards B Corp status to companies that operate in a socially 
and environmentally responsible manner (Honeyman 2014). 
Some scholars have argued that this trend toward marketization may harm democracy and 
citizenship by undermining nonprofit organizations’ ability to create and maintain a strong civil 
society (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). Others applaud this development, arguing that many 
governmental and philanthropic efforts have fallen short of expectations (Dees 1998) and that 
leveraging market forces can achieve social change on a larger scale than traditional nonprofits 
have been able to muster (Crutchfield and Grant 2012). 
In this chapter, we review how nonprofits are using information disclosure strategies to influence 
corporations. These strategies differ in terms of whether they focus on individual products or on 
firms, and in terms of their prescriptiveness. More specifically, we discuss three types of 
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information disclosure strategies: certification of green or socially responsible products, also 
called eco-labeling; codification and certification of corporate disclosure of environmental 
performance; and certification of different types of firm governance structure. 
What Are Information Disclosure Strategies? 
Information disclosure strategies have four main elements, as depicted in Figure 1: codification, 
standardization, certification, and communication. Each element pertains to information about 
the environmental or social impact of corporate products or practices. 
 
Figure 1. The four elements of information disclosure strategies 
 
First, codification represents the conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. 
Codification of information about environmental and social performance is important because 
that information involves a complex phenomenon that can be interpreted and evaluated in many 
ways (Delmas, Etzion, and Nairn-Birch, 2013). Perhaps the best-known codification scheme is 
the Toxic Release Inventory, which the EPA has operated since 1988; it requires firms that emit 
more than a threshold level of toxic chemicals to report such emissions according to a structured 
process. More recently, voluntary schemes operated by NGOs have emerged, including the 
Global Reporting Initiative, which provides a structured process for corporate sustainability 
reporting, and CDP (formerly called the Carbon Disclosure Project), which provides a structured 
process for corporate reporting of greenhouse gas emissions and strategic responses to climate 
change. 
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Second, standardization involves setting environmental performance standards for participating 
products or organizations. Standards reflect explicitly formulated and explicitly adopted rules 
and thus differ from social norms, which are implicit (Brunsson, Rasche, and Seidl 2012). The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines a standard as a “document, 
established by consensus, and approved by a recognized body, that provides for common and 
repeated use, rules, guidelines, or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the 
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context” (International Organization for 
Standardization 2001:8). Two prominent examples of standards are those created for coffee 
farming by Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (hereinafter Fairtrade) and those 
created for forest management by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
Third, certification occurs when a recognized entity attests that a product or organization has met 
a certain standard or level of achievement. Third-party certification lends credibility to an 
information disclosure strategy because it provides independent monitoring that eliminates 
potential conflicts of interest (Delmas 2002; D’Souza, Taghian, and Lamb 2006; Jahn, Schramm, 
and Spiller 2005; Leire and Thidell 2005; Nilsson, Tunçer, and Thidell 2004). Most, but not all, 
standards set by NGOs include a certification process to ensure compliance. 
Fourth, communication takes the form of a labeling system that conveys information to 
stakeholders. Labeling is typically applied to products and helps solve problems related to 
information asymmetry between corporations and consumers at the point of sale (Delmas and 
Grant 2014.) 
One typical example of an information disclosure strategy is the use of eco-labels, which signal 
to consumers the environmental attributes of a product. The goal of eco-labels is to provide 
easily interpretable information and thereby elicit increased demand for products perceived as 
environmentally favorable (Delmas and Grant 2014). Examples of eco-labels developed by 
nonprofits include the FSC label for lumber, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) label for 
food products that come from sustainable fisheries, and the Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) label for green buildings. Although information disclosure 
strategies often include all four elements, nonprofits sometimes choose to use only some of them. 
For example, some eco-labels do not include third-party certification. And as we discuss shortly, 
CDP includes codification and certification but not standardization or communication (labeling). 
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Information disclosure strategies may include both a positive and a negative aspect—in other 
words, a “carrot” and a “stick” (Fleckinger, Glachant, and Moineville 2017). Such a strategy can 
focus on praising companies whose products or practices rise above the standard established by a 
nonprofit, or it can focus on shaming companies that fall below the standard. Although shaming 
bad performers was traditionally the more widely used tool, nonprofits now rely increasingly on 
praising good performers. For example, nonprofits such as Greenpeace and RAN gained renown 
for their aggressive media-based strategies to shame companies that engage in rainforest 
deforestation or that use nonsustainable palm oil (Coombs 2014; Copeland and Smith 2014). In 
these cases, the objective was to boycott products or practices that nonprofits judged to be 
undesirable. Praising good performance proves to be a little more challenging, because praise 
can increase demand and hence increase the total environmental footprint associated with that 
performance (Feddersen and Gilligan 2001; Baron and Diermeier 2007). In addition, it is easier 
to screen out unacceptable practices than to decide on which practices are acceptable. 
Information disclosure strategies can be defined as a type of governance, or as “a social function 
centered on efforts to guide or steer societies toward collectively beneficial outcomes and away 
from outcomes that are collectively harmful” (Delmas and Young 2009:6). These strategies can 
be useful for addressing environmental problems that are difficult to solve in a regulatory 
context—for example, because they involve international externalities that cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. Theory and empirical evidence both suggest that information disclosure strategies 
can lead to improved environmental performance by increasing (1) consumer awareness of a 
firm’s environmental performance, (2) a firm’s liability under legal statutes, (3) pressure from 
investors and/or employees to report a firm’s pollution abatement, and (4) a firm’s susceptibility 
to community coercion (Delmas, Montes-Sancho, and Shimshack 2010; Kirchhoff 2000; 
Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000; Reid and Toffel 2009; Roe et al. 2001). 
Nonprofits are not the only entities to develop information disclosure strategies. Governments 
and industry or trade associations use these strategies as well, either independently or in 
collaboration with nonprofits. Governments have traditionally been the main source of 
information about the environmental or social performance of firms or products. For example, 
the EPA publishes information on chemical and toxic substances that are manufactured in, or 
imported into, the United States (Hamilton 1995). However, nonprofits are now increasingly 
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taking the lead in performing such functions (Vandenbergh and Raker 2017), either 
independently or through multi-stakeholder organizations. For example, the MSC is an 
organization that brings together actors from the for-profit sector, civil society, and the public 
(Chiroleu-Assouline and Wijen, forthcoming). 
Because NGO-led certification systems do not rely on government for rule-making authority but 
instead derive their authority from stakeholders who choose whether to demand products that 
receive certification, Benjamin Cashore (2002), together with his colleagues Graeme Auld and 
Deanna Newsom (2004a), refers to these systems as non-state market driven (NSMD). Others 
refer to these systems as a form of private regulation: in other words, they are a governance 
system formed by a coalition of nongovernment actors to codify and monitor the conduct of 
private entities (Bartley 2007; Büthe 2010, Mayer and Gereffi 2010). 
Although policies for corporate disclosure or product labeling backed by government coercion 
require compliance by all market actors, systems of product labeling developed by nonprofits are 
voluntary and allow market actors to adopt or ignore labeling requirements as they see fit. This 
distinction raises questions about the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure strategies, and we will 
address these questions more fully in the following sections. For now, we note that in principle, 
voluntary disclosure can be sufficient to induce full disclosure of information if the receivers of 
information (such as consumers or investors) assume that a failure to disclose indicates poor 
performance (Milgrom and Roberts 1986). However, a failure to disclose may not be perceived 
as dispositive if disclosure is costly (Verrecchia 1983) or if there is a possibility that the sender 
of information (such as a certification body) is not fully informed (Shin 2003). Thus, one should 
expect that voluntary disclosure will generally be less effective than mandatory disclosure. 
We turn now to a discussion of specific nonprofit-led information disclosure strategies, 
beginning with product eco-labels. 
 
Information Disclosure Strategies to Influence Product Environmental Impact 
Over the past two decades, product eco-labels have become increasingly common. Eco-labeling 
is a voluntary method of codification, standard setting, certification, and communication that 
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focuses on the environmental or social performance of products. The objective of eco-labels is to 
reduce an information asymmetry between producers and consumers of green products by 
providing credible information about a product’s environmentally responsible attributes (Crespi 
and Marette 2005). Typically, consumers have limited access to information that would help 
them accurately assess invisible product attributes such as social and environmental 
performance. Eco-labels can prompt informed purchasing choices by environmentally 
responsible consumers (Leire and Thidell 2005:1062) without resorting to regulation. 
For example, the FSC, an international multistakeholder nonprofit organization, issues an FSC 
eco-label for wood products that have met FSC criteria.5 Products bearing this label originate 
from a forest that an independent, third-party organization has determined to be well managed. 
The FSC requires a chain-of-custody certification before a product can be labeled as FSC-
certified. This certification mandates the tracking of a wood product from forest to consumer, 
providing an audit trail to ensure that the product came from a sustainably managed forest. As of 
January 2018, some two hundred million hectares in eighty-six countries were certified as 
compliant with the FSC’s Principles and Criteria—an amount that marked a 200 percent increase 
over the preceding ten years. (See Figure 2.)6 
 
                                                 
5 http://us.fsc.org, accessed July 11, 2019. 
6 https://ic.fsc.org/en/facts-and-figures, accessed September 19, 2018. 
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Figure 2. Forest Area Certified by FSC from 2000 to 2018
 
Source: https://ic.fsc.org/en/facts-and-figures 
 
Another example is Fairtrade coffee. Scholars have shown that the Fairtrade eco-label 
contributes direct and indirect benefits to small-scale farmers, their families, and their 
communities by improving children’s education and home quality and by lowering debt (Murray, 
Raynolds, and Taylor 2003; Jaffee 2007; Bacon et al. 2008; Utting-Chamorro 2005). By 2007, 
Fairtrade had certified 62,219 metric tons of coffee and had attained the biggest market share for 
a socially responsible coffee standard. By the end of 2016, there were 1,411 Fairtrade-certified 
producer organizations in 73 countries, representing more than 1.66 million Fairtrade farmers 
and workers (Fairtrade International, 2016).7 In 2016, Fairtrade-certified sales amounted to 
approximately €7.88 billion worldwide, a total that represented a 485 percent increase from 
2006. (See Figure 3.)8 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 https://annualreport16-17.fairtrade.net/en/ 
8 https://annualreport16-17.fairtrade.net/en/. 
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Figure 3. Revenue of Fairtrade International products worldwide from 2006 to 2016 (in 
millions of euros) 
 
Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/271354/revenue-of-fair-trade-products-worldwide-since-2004/ 
 
According to the Ecolabel Index directory, the number of eco-label programs has grown from a 
mere dozen worldwide in the 1990s to more than 460 today. Moreover, these programs now span 
199 countries and 25 industry sectors.9 But this growth has been accompanied by consumer 
confusion and organizational skepticism. For example, consumers have admitted to difficulties in 
recognizing the differences among eco-labels for coffee, of which there are now at least six 
(Delmas and Clements 2017). In early 2012, the British supermarket chain Tesco PLC dropped 
the United Kingdom’s Carbon Trust label, citing the label’s prohibitively high costs and minimal 
consumer recognition (Quinn 2012). However, there is no denying that both the overall value of 
eco-products and the recognition of certain eco-labels are growing. For example, in the United 
States, retail sales of organic foods increased from $3.8 billion in 1997 to $40 billion in 2017.10 
Moreover, nearly four out of five U.S. households recognize the Energy Star label, which is a 
joint project of the EPA and the U.S. Department of Energy (EPA. 2010). In fact, American 
                                                 
9 http://www.ecolabelindex.com, accessed September 9, 2018. 
10 https://www.statista.com/statistics/235805/us-retail-sales-of-natural-and-organic-food/, accessed September 12, 
2018. 
1,623
2,381
2,895
3,443
4,319
4,984 4,787
5,500
5,900
7,300
7,880
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Revenue in million euros
   
11 
 
consumers have purchased more than one billion Energy Star–labeled products (EPA, 2012). 
What might explain such variations in value and recognition? Why are consumers drawn to 
certain eco-labels more than others? 
The efficacy of eco-labels as a policy tool to achieve environmental and social objectives has 
been the subject of considerable scholarly research. This literature has focused on single eco-
labels (Albersmeier, Schulze, and Spiller 2009), on how eco-labels are perceived by consumers 
(Botanaki et al. 2005; Batte et al. 2007, Loureiro and Lotade 2005; Leire and Thidell 2005), on 
consumers’ inclination to change their purchasing behavior in favor of eco-labels (Loureiro 
2003; Blamey et al. 2000), on the environmental and social benefits of eco-labels (Blackman and 
Rivera 2011), and on how institutional context facilitates or hinders the effectiveness of eco-
labels (Utting-Chamorro 2005; Utting 2009). Broadly speaking, this research shows that 
consumer awareness and understanding of eco-labels, the credibility in those labels, and 
consumer willingness to pay for an eco-labeled product all favor the diffusion of eco-labels 
(Leire and Thidell 2005; Delmas, Nairn-Birch and Balzarova 2013). It also shows that these 
strategies do not operate in an institutional vacuum. We review these elements in more detail in 
the following sections. 
Consumer Awareness and Understanding 
Environmental products are credence goods, which means that it is difficult for consumers to 
assess the validity of certain claims made about their environmental quality. Eco-labels are a tool 
for conveying information about environmental or social impact (Anderson and Hansen 2004) 
and, in particular, for reducing the search costs related to that information (Teisl, Roe, and Hicks 
2002). If an eco-label is to successfully reduce information search costs, consumers need to have 
awareness and understanding of the eco-label. Awareness involves the extent to which 
consumers know about the existence of an eco-label program (Banerjee and Solomon 2003:109). 
Understanding involves consumers’ ability to interpret the connection between an environmental 
issue, a label’s meaning, and the actions taken by the eco-label program to mitigate the issue 
(Banerjee and Solomon 2003:109). 
 For example, by 2004, public awareness of the Fairtrade label was reported to be at 63 percent 
in Luxembourg, 50 percent in the United Kingdom, 44 percent in Ireland, and 39 percent in 
Sweden (Krier 2007). A phone survey in 2008 found that 48 percent of Canadian respondents 
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and 36 percent of U.S. respondents were somewhat or very familiar with the Fairtrade label. The 
same survey found that 71 percent of Canadians and 62 percent of Americans were somewhat or 
very familiar with organic labels (Feinberg et al. 2008). Taken as a whole, this data indicates that 
Fairtrade has done well in raising awareness among consumers (Auld 2010). 
Consumer awareness is a necessary factor in the success of an eco-label scheme, but consumers 
must also be able to understand the environmental information conveyed by each label and how 
this information may vary across certification programs. Research shows that only 20 percent of 
coffee consumers have a good understanding of the organic coffee eco-label, and a much smaller 
share of consumers have a good understanding of competing coffee eco-labels, including those 
provided by RAN Bird Friendly, Fairtrade, and UTZ (Delmas and Clements 2017). 
Credibility 
The credibility of the eco-labeling process is also essential to facilitating consumer confidence in 
eco-labels and consumers’ willingness to purchase eco-labeled products. Credibility can be 
defined as the perception, or assumption, that the operations of an actor or agent are trustworthy, 
responsible, desirable, and appropriate (Cashore et al 2004b).11 
Eco-labels take different forms. In some cases, they are issued by independent organizations that 
develop transparent environmental criteria and use third-party verification. In other cases, they 
merely represent claims by manufacturers to be environmentally friendly in some way (Ibanez 
and Grolleau 2008). The presence of the second type of eco-label may produce confusion about 
credibility in the minds of consumers. Unsubstantiated claims can result in adverse selection; if 
producers provide false or misleading information about environmental attributes and underlying 
production practices, consumers may choose products that do not, in fact have the attributes 
claimed by that type of eco-label (Grodsky 1993; Ibanez and Grolleau 2008). 
There is some evidence that the profusion of eco-labels creates confusion among customers 
about the goals, credibility, and expected benefits of an eco-label, and that this confusion has an 
adverse impact on the success or adoption rate of an eco-label (Leire and Thidell 2005; Delmas 
                                                 
11 Adapted from a similar definition of legitimacy (Cashore et al. 2004b:188). 
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and Lessem 2017; Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011). This confusion can inhibit the 
benefits that the eco-labels seek to achieve. 
To be credible, eco-label programs should be transparent, nondeceptive, free from conflicts of 
interest, accepted by stakeholders, and based on reliable assessment procedures (Bass and Simula 
1999). This set of attributes can be achieved for any given eco-label standard by satisfying the 
following elements of standard governance: stringency, stakeholder involvement, third-party 
certification, and transparency. 
Stringency. An eco-label’s credibility depends on whether its standard is stringent enough to 
signal exemplary environmental performance. Consumers will quickly lose confidence in a label 
that fails to differentiate poor performance from good performance. The contrast between the 
labeling schemes implemented by the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
(PEFC), the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), and the FSC helps illustrate the concept of 
stringency. PEFC and SFI are widespread schemes that do not require a minimum level of 
performance among participants. The FSC, meanwhile, mandates specific levels of 
performance.12 In 2001, an environmental organization called ForestEthics attacked SFI for its 
lack of stringency and described the label as a “green façade.”13 As a consequence, seven 
companies—including four Fortune 500 corporations (Aetna, Allstate, Office Depot, and 
Symantec)—said they would phase out their use of the label. 
Stakeholder involvement. Stakeholder involvement is a key component of the credibility of eco-
labels (Leire and Thidell 2005). For example, this element has been a fundamental principle of 
the development of FSC standards. The FSC claims that its process for developing standards is 
clear and accessible, that no stakeholder interest dominates that process, and that all interested 
stakeholders take part in the process (FSC 2007). The FSC board of directors includes 
representatives from environmental NGOs, rural development agencies, human rights and 
worker organizations, and industry groups, as well as consumers of forest products (Gerez 
Fernández and Alatorre Guzman 2003). The FSC’s global standards are developed and modified 
through a participatory process involving environmental, social, and economic stakeholders, and 
                                                 
12 https://us.fsc.org/en-us/certification/forest-management-certification  
13 http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2011/03/30/whos-peddling-pulp-fiction-sfi-vs-fsc-forestry-wars, accessed July 11, 
2019. 
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those standards provide a framework for developing specific standards for different regions, 
countries, or ecosystems (Counsell and Loraas 2002; Freris and Laschefeski 2001). 
When an eco-label scheme does not involve all representative stakeholders in its design and 
operations, it can be criticized for its lack of independence from a specific group of stakeholders. 
For example, the MSC was launched as a collaboration between Unilever, the world’s largest 
purchaser of frozen food, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), an international 
conservation organization. This exclusive relationship caused much controversy because it failed 
to involve a wide range of stakeholders in the design and implementation of the label (Constance 
and Bonanno 2000). To strengthen its independence and fend off assertions that it was a puppet 
of WWF and Unilever, the MSC was restructured as a fully independent nonprofit organization 
in 1999 (Cummins 2004). 
Third-party certification. Third-party certification is “a procedure by which a third party 
provides written assurance that a product, process or service conforms to specified standards, on 
the basis of an audit conducted to agreed procedures” (Bass, Markopoulous, and Grah 2001). For 
example, the MSC certification program accredits independent entities that assess fisheries 
against the standard that the MSC has developed (Potts and Howard 2007). Third-party 
certification has been shown to be the most effective mechanism for guaranteeing not only 
improved environmental or social performance (Blackman and Rivera 2011) but also credibility 
in the eyes of consumers (Leire and Thidell 2005). 
Transparency. Transparency represents the ability of external parties to access information 
regarding the sustainability and governance practices adopted by an eco-label scheme. For 
example, consumers should be able to trace green products through a transparent chain of 
custody. The FSC standard maintains a chain-of-custody system that tracks timber from an 
original FSC-certified forest to its purchase by consumers. It requires certification bodies to 
make their reports on forest management audits and their risk assessments of Controlled Wood 
publicly available on the Internet. In contrast, PEFC only provides public summaries of audit 
reports and suffers from weaknesses in its reporting and auditing process (Auld and Gulbrandsen 
2009). 
In conclusion, consumer confidence in the credibility of an eco-label can be enhanced by 
stringency in the use of environmental or social criteria, involvement of representative 
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stakeholders, third-party certification, and transparency about the certification process. Yet even 
with high levels of consumer awareness and understanding, credibility may not be enough to 
ensure that a label will increase sales of product. Another important challenge for an eco-label 
involves the willingness of consumers to pay a premium for eco-labeled products. 
Willingness to Pay 
Eco-labeled products often carry a price premium because of the additional cost associated with 
meeting environmental or social standards. This price premium represents both the cost of 
certification to an eco-label and the cost of changes associated with improved performance. For 
example, studies show that these additional costs range between 15 percent and 30 percent for 
organic wine certification (Delmas, Doctori, and Shuster 2006). Consumers must be willing to 
pay such costs in order for the eco-label to thrive. 
Some research suggests that few people are willing to pay a premium to advance the 
environmental or social impact of a product (Vogel 2005). For example, in the ten years since 
forest certification first emerged, many producers of certified wood have failed to receive a price 
premium for their products (Wilson, Takahashi, and Vertinsky 2001; Anderson and Hansen 
2004). In some cases, to be sure, altruistic customers may purchase eco-labeled products as a 
substitute for donations to an environmental organization (Kotchen 2005). However, such 
altruistic customers may represent only a small percentage of all consumers. Indeed, research 
shows that genuinely altruistic, “true blue green” customers represent just 9 percent of the 
population (Roper Organization and Johnson Wax 1990). 
Recent research indicates that consumers are more likely to purchase green products if those 
products provide additional private benefits (Delmas and Colgan 2018). Green products have 
been defined as an “impure public good” because they yield both public and private benefits 
(Cornes and Sandler 1996; Ferraro, Uchida, and Conrad 2005; Kotchen 2005). Maria K. 
Magnusson and her colleagues (2001) found that the most important purchasing criteria for 
organic products were related to private benefits, such as quality, rather than environmental 
attributes. 
Another private benefit commonly associated with green products concerns their health 
attributes. Many consumers assume that organic foods not only taste better but also provide 
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greater health benefits than their conventionally grown counterparts (Huang 1996; Huang and 
Lin 2007; Jolly and Norris 1991). In some cases, that assumption is valid. Cows that produce 
milk certified as organic by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, for example, are not exposed to 
the kinds of carcinogenic hormones, antibiotics, and pesticides that are used in conventional 
dairy practices.14 Several studies show that health concerns, along with environmental concerns, 
are a major reason why people choose organic food products (Davies, Titterington, and Cochrane 
1995; Tregear, Dent, and McGregor 1994; Wandel and Bugge 1997). 
Additional motivations to purchase green products include conspicuous consumption and peer 
pressure. Research shows that visibly prosocial actions act as a signal of virtue, creating a 
positive reputation for those who take such actions. Psychologists have found that having such a 
reputation allows consumers to obtain a number of nonmarket goods, such as trust (Barclay 
2004), friends, allies, romantic partners (Griskevicius et al 2007; Miller 2009), and leadership 
positions (Hardy and Van Vugt 2006). In a context where purchasing green products or 
exhibiting green behavior is the norm, social pressure can reinforce an individual’s desire to 
purchase a green vehicle (Kahn 2007) or an eco-labeled product. Similarly, Charles J. Corbett 
and Suresh Muthulingam (2007) show that the adoption of LEED certification is related to 
signaling behavior; an organization that pursues that label aims to communicate something about 
its practices to other parties, including regulators, customers, and the public. 
In summary, although consumers may wish to buy green products, the price premium for doing 
do is a strong deterrent. Their willingness to pay for green products is typically rooted not in 
altruism but in the private benefits that these products provide or in the status that comes with 
purchasing such products (Delmas and Colgan 2018). 
In addition, the effectiveness of eco-labels will vary according to the institutional and economic 
environment in which they operate. For example, Karla Utting-Chamorro (2005) studied the 
effectiveness of Fairtrade in Nicaragua and concluded that the ability of that eco-label scheme to 
significantly raise living standards for small coffee producers was limited by factors such as the 
                                                 
14 http://www.organicfacts.net/organic-animal-products/organic-milk/health-benefits-of-organic-milk.html, accessed 
July 11, 2019. 
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debt problems faced by cooperatives, a lack of government support, and volatile international 
coffee prices. We will address this point in more detail in the conclusion. 
Summary 
In this section, we have reviewed the literature on eco-labels to evaluate the efficacy of eco-label 
schemes with respect to three elements: consumer awareness and understanding, credibility, and 
willingness to pay. These elements vary widely across eco-labels, and even the most prominent 
eco-labels have achieved only limited consumer awareness and acceptance. Thus, they are no 
substitute for government regulation. Still, they can help promote environmental improvement 
efforts that go beyond the level required by regulation. (In some cases, of course, regulation is 
absent.) 
Information Disclosure Strategies to Influence Corporate Practices 
Nonprofits also use information disclosure strategies to encourage socially responsible practices 
at the firm level. For example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) offers guidelines to assist 
firms with reporting systems. GRI is an international, independent organization that helps 
businesses, governments, and other organizations understand—and communicate information 
about—their performance in areas such as climate change, human rights, and corruption. Like 
the international environmental management standard ISO 14001, the GRI framework enables 
third parties to assess the environmental impact of a company’s direct activities, as well as 
activities in its supply chain. The GRI guidelines include reporting criteria on energy, 
biodiversity, and emissions. Over nine thousand organizations currently report with GRI.15 
Another example is CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project), a nonprofit organization that 
aims to induce companies to disclose their exposure to risks associated with climate change and 
to improve their preparedness for such risks. In this section, we describe how CDP has become a 
prominent and influential institution that shapes the ways corporations report on their carbon 
emissions. We review the literature to understand the drivers of participation in CDP, the quality 
of the information disclosed through CDP, and the effectiveness of the CDP program. This 
                                                 
15 Global Reporting Initiative 2016. 
   
18 
 
example allows us to contrast the design of firm-level disclosure strategies with that of product-
level disclosure strategies. 
Although it is a nonprofit, CDP has secured primary support from a group of more eight hundred 
institutional investors with more than $100 trillion in assets as of 2018. These investors include 
Bank of America, BlackRock, California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), 
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley, among others. Since 2002, CDP has asked the world’s 
largest companies every year to complete a detailed questionnaire that covers their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, along with the risks, opportunities, and management strategies associated 
with those emissions. CDP publicly discloses company responses on its website, presumably in 
the hope that publicizing this information will affect investment behavior. 
Investors have expressed concern over the financial risks to which companies might be exposed 
because of climate change. Two types of financial risk contribute to this concern. One type 
involves the direct effects of changing weather patterns and rising sea levels. The other type 
involves the effects of regulation, such as increased exposure to abatement and liability costs. 
In addition, there are important philosophical issues related to defining the emissions that a firm 
must report. So-called Scope 1 emissions come directly from a firm’s own facilities, and there is 
no dispute that these emissions can be attributed to the producing firm. Scope 2 emissions are 
indirectly associated with production processes; the most common example involves emissions 
generated from the electricity used by a manufacturing firm. There is some controversy over 
whether these emissions should be attributed to the manufacturer, or whether they should be 
attributed solely to the electricity producer. Scope 3 emissions emerge during the use of a 
product itself, as when a consumer drives an emission-producing vehicle. These emissions also 
engender considerable controversy over proper attribution (Matisoff, Noonan, and O’Brien 
2013). CDP only requires that Scope 1 emissions be reported, although it encourages reporting of 
other types of emissions as well. 
Participation in CDP has grown rapidly. The first cycle of the project (CDP1) was endorsed by 
35 institutional investors with $4.5 trillion in assets, and results were made public on February 
17 2003. Among companies on the FT Global 500 list, 71 percent responded to the CDP1 
questionnaire and 45 percent answered it in full. Since then, both the number of institutional 
investors who have endorsed CDP and the questionnaire response rate have steadily increased. 
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By the fourth cycle (CDP4), the project had been endorsed by 225 institutional investors with 
more than $31 trillion in assets. The CDP4 results, which were made public on September 18, 
2006, showed that among FT Global 500 companies, 91 percent responded to the questionnaire 
and 72 percent answered it in full (Kim and Lyon 2011b). By 2017, more than 2,500 unique 
companies were participating in CDP. (See Figure 4.)16 
Figure 4. Number of companies disclosing to CDP per year 
 
Source: https://www.cdp.net/en/scores-2017 
 
Researchers have explored four main questions about CDP. First, they have studied the factors 
that make one firm more likely than another to participate in CDP. Second, they have studied the 
impact of CDP participation on share prices using event study methods. Third, they have studied 
the impact of CDP participation on environmental performance. Fourth, they have studied the 
quality of the disclosures made to CDP and the usefulness of information in CDP reports. 
Drivers of Participation 
Participation in CDP is voluntary, in that it is not mandated by law. Still, pressure from activists, 
investors, and other stakeholders, as well as media coverage, may influence which firms decide 
                                                 
16 https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us, accessed July 11, 2019. 
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to participate. Moreover, internal characteristics of firms, such as the nature of their leadership 
team, might influence decisions to participate. 
Erin M. Reid and Michael W. Toffel (2009) found that firms were more likely to participate in 
CDP if they or others in their industry faced shareholder resolutions or threats of state regulation. 
Ben W. Lewis, Judith L. Walls, and Glen W. S. Dowell (2014) found that firms led by newly 
appointed CEOs or by CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to CDP, while those 
led by CEOs with law degrees are less likely to respond. Walid Ben-Amar, Millicent Chang, and 
Philip McIlkenny (2017) found that for a sample of publicly listed Canadian firms over the 
period 2008–2014, the likelihood of CDP participation increased with the percentage of women 
serving on a firm’s board of directors. Dayuan Li and his colleagues (2018) found that Chinese 
firms are more likely to participate in CDP if they are large, if they have received more-favorable 
media treatment on environmental issues, and if they hold environment-related patents. 
Stock Market Impact of Participation 
One would expect firms’ voluntary participation in CDP to be associated with higher share 
prices. Such participation, in other words, functions as a signal of superior environmental 
performance, and hence would be expected to positively affect a firm’s stock price—relative to 
the stock prices of nonparticipants—around the date of CDP disclosure. 
 Beyond the direct effect of disclosure, one might also expect CDP participation to have an 
indirect effect on shareholder value by moderating the impact of external shocks. Indeed, the 
empirical literature suggests that investors view firms with more-extensive prior disclosures as 
being better prepared for possible future environmental regulations. Rationality-based stock 
valuation models suggest that a firm’s share price is the present value of expected cash flows, 
discounted at the appropriate rate of return. A regulatory threat has a potentially negative effect 
on a firm’s expected cash flows because it raises the possibility of future regulatory costs 
associated with compliance, payment of penalties, or liability. Those costs, in turn, would 
decrease the firm’s expected future cash flows. Thus, when the threat of regulation increases, 
investors may take a more favorable view of firms that are better prepared to cope with 
environmental regulation. 
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Kim and Lyon (2011b) found no systematic evidence that CDP participation during the period 
2003–2006, in and of itself, directly increased share prices. Consistent with the work of Reid and 
Toffel (2009), this finding suggests that participation was not entirely voluntary but was the 
result of pressure from shareholders, regulators, and institutional investors involved in CDP. 
(Profit-maximizing firms normally take actions to increase profits. If participation was a 
voluntary decision, presumably it would increase profits, but this did not occur.) However, Kim 
and Lyon also examine indirect effects of CDP participation—that is, the possibility that CDP 
participation buffered the firm from the impact of exogenous events on share prices. In 
particular, the share prices of CDP participants were less affected by exogenous events (e.g., 
Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on October 22 2004) that caused the likelihood of 
environmental regulation to rise. The authors estimate that this buffering effect had a value of 
$8.6 billion, or about 86 percent of the size of the carbon market in 2005. 
Lee and colleagues (2015) studied a sample of Korean firms that participated in CDP in 2008 
and 2009, and they found that participants saw their share prices drop. However, this effect was 
mitigated if a firm had released its carbon news periodically through the media in advance of its 
CDP disclosure. These findings are consistent with several other studies, which show that 
voluntary disclosure of carbon emission reductions lowers share prices (Jacobs, Singhal, and 
Subramanian 2010; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn 2011; Lyon et al. 2013). 
However, Ella Mae Matsumura, Rachna Prakash, and Sandra C. Vera-Muñoz (2014) studied 
CDP data from 2006 to 2008 and found that participants saw their share prices rise, although this 
benefit decreased as the level of reported emissions increased. Patrick J. Callery and Jessica 
Perkins (2017) found evidence that among firms that choose to disclose carbon management 
strategy and their carbon emissions performance, those that achieve higher performance scores 
from CDP attain higher capital market value. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that firms receive little direct financial benefit from participating 
in CDP. Evidence is stronger that CDP participation can buffer a firm against losses from 
increased regulatory threats. Moreover, exactly how a firm reports its CDP disclosure makes a 
difference in how the market responds. Reporting regularly on performance via the media and 
providing details on a firm’s carbon management strategy enhance investors’ response to a 
firm’s carbon disclosure. 
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Environmental Impact of Participation 
Models of voluntary disclosure suggest that CDP participants are most likely to be firms that 
already have better environmental performance than nonparticipants (Milgrom 1981; Verrecchia 
1983; Shin 2003). However, if participation is not voluntary—if it results from pressure by 
concerned stakeholders—firms with poorer environmental performance may be more likely to 
participate than those with better performance. One might also expect that participation in CDP 
would have a direct effect on environmental performance, because participation makes it easier 
for external stakeholders to obtain data about firm performance and hence to apply pressure for 
improvement. 
The environmental impact of participation is obviously important but has received little research 
attention. However, Daniel C. Matisoff (2013) studied the first four years of CDP 2003–2007, 
and found that corporate participation in the project had no impact on plant-level carbon 
emissions, emissions intensity, or industrial output. 
Quality of Disclosures 
Although CDP provides participants with a structured questionnaire, it may be possible for a 
firm to manipulate its reporting so as to greenwash its image—to make its performance look 
greener than it really is (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Lyon and Maxwell 2011). One way a 
firm can improve its appearance is by limiting its reporting to cover only Scope 1 emissions. 
Another way is by manipulating how it responds to the portion of the CDP questionnaire that 
allows for unstructured, long-form answers. 
 Matisoff and his colleagues (2013) found that over the period 2003–2010, reporting of Scope 2 
emissions had improved but the transparency and quality of reporting on direct (Scope 1) 
emissions and Scope 3 emissions had not. During that period, Japanese and European Union 
firms had increased transparency, while American firms had decreased transparency. Energy-
intensive industries had either increased transparency or remained the same, while less energy-
intensive industries had become less transparent. Chonnikarn Jira and Michael W. Toffel (2013) 
studied Scope 2 emissions and found that suppliers are more likely to share climate impact 
information when buyers’ requests for such information are more prevalent, when buyers appear 
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to be committed to using such information, when suppliers belong to more-profitable industries, 
and when suppliers are located in countries with greenhouse gas regulations. 
Kira Fabrizio and Eun-Hee Kim (2016) found that firms vary widely in terms of the readability 
of the open-ended section of their CDP reports. These researchers also found that on average, the 
performance score awarded by CDP does not predict subsequent environmental performance, at 
least as measured by a firm’s Scope 1 emissions. However, in the case of reports with higher 
readability scores, the CDP performance score does predict subsequent performance. Callery and 
Perkins (2017) studied ways in which participants can manipulate the structured portions of the 
CDP questionnaire and found that many participants provide misleading disclosures in an 
attempt to maximize scores while avoiding substantive performance improvements. The most 
egregious form of this practice occurs when firms claim reduced emissions over time, even 
though the absolute level of emissions they report is higher than the level they reported in 
previous years. (This is the same type of strategic disclosure behavior identified by Kim and 
Lyon (2011a), who also show that many firms claimed emissions reductions even when their 
actual level of emissions increased over time.) This type of manipulation is less common among 
firms that obtained third-party assurance of their reports. Happily, there is evidence that CDP’s 
evaluation of firm performance is usually not distorted by greenwashing techniques of this kind. 
Summary 
CDP has become a prominent and influential nonprofit institution that shapes how corporations 
report on their carbon emissions. Most large companies now feel compelled to report to CDP on 
their emissions, the risks that climate change poses for their financial performance, and the steps 
they are taking to minimize those risks. This development has certainly increased awareness of 
the importance of climate change within the business sector. In addition, since “what gets 
measured gets managed,” one would expect CDP participation to result in better management of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Research shows that participation in CDP is driven by both external 
stakeholder pressures and internal corporate characteristics. Participation does not appear to have 
strong direct financial benefits, but it may help buffer a firm against external shocks that increase 
the risk of regulation. Unfortunately, participation alone does not appear to lead to improved 
environmental performance. However, companies that provide higher-quality reports to CDP do 
appear to reduce their emissions in subsequent years. 
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Information Disclosure Strategies to Influence Firm Governance Structures 
Nonprofits have begun to use information disclosure strategies to change the governance of for-
profit organizations in order to encourage them to internalize environmental and social costs. In 
particular, they are fostering the adoption of hybrid organizational forms that embed social 
purpose within a business enterprise (Doherty, Haugh, and Lyon 2014). Like other information 
disclosure strategies, this approach involves standard setting, certification, and labeling. 
However, it applies those practices not to a single product but to an entire organization—which 
is a much more complex undertaking. 
Social enterprises are a prominent example of a hybrid form. They combine the kind of purpose-
driven organizing that characterizes nonprofits with a revenue-generating mechanism that can 
enable financial independence and scalability. In doing so, they incorporate two potentially 
conflicting logics: that of the for-profit corporation, which seeks to capitalize on market 
opportunities to maximize profit, and that of the nonprofit, which seeks to harness financial 
resources to achieve social or environmental benefits. Social enterprises belong to what some 
refer to as the “social economy” and represent a departure from a purely capitalistic model. Some 
observers argue that hybrid social enterprises have the potential to achieve social change on a 
grander scale than nonprofits can achieve because they have a looser constraint on attracting 
resources than nonprofits do (Crutchfield and Grant 2012). 
Benefit corporations are the most common legal structure for social enterprise in the United 
States, and they are growing significantly in number (Cooney et al. 2014). The structure was 
initially developed by B Lab, a Philadelphia-based nonprofit that was founded in 2008. B Lab 
oversees the Certified B Corp certification for socially minded corporations. The certification 
was crafted in the style of LEED or FairTrade, but it applies to companies that operate in a 
socially and environmentally responsible manner (Honeyman 2014). B Lab assesses a 
company’s net social and environmental impact using an extensive evaluation framework called 
the B Impact Assessment. Organizations receiving an overall score of 80 or more are eligible for 
the certification. As part of its advocacy of social enterprise, B Lab has lobbied for legislation to 
form a legal structure that fills a niche between 501(c) nonprofit designation and the traditional C 
corporation. As of 2018, thirty-three U.S. states offered legal “benefit corporation” status. 
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B Lab has a standardized certification process that allows for comparison across sectors. Indeed, 
all B Corps are audited through a somewhat similar process. Although the version of B Impact 
Assessment that a company uses depends on its region, industry, and size, most of the questions 
on the assessment are common to all versions. This similarity across industry, region, and size 
allows researchers to examine the social performance of B Corps across a broad cross-section of 
the economy. B Corp certification is transparent and gives researchers access to a wide range of 
information. B Lab has posted most of its impact reports on its website, thereby enabling site 
visitors to evaluate the performance of any B Corp. B Lab also recently open-sourced a dataset 
of assessment scores on the website https://data.world (an open-data resource that focuses on B 
Corps). 
Much of the current empirical research on social enterprise domains focuses on B Corps. In the 
introduction to a 2018 special edition of the Journal of Business Venturing that focuses on this 
structure, Peter W. Moroz and his colleagues (2018) lay out several reasons for the growing 
research interest in B Corps: “[B Corps] provide a rich backdrop in the field of entrepreneurship 
with respect to how prosocial opportunities are formed, and the factors that moderate how they 
endure and change over time” (Moroz et al. 2018). 
The original nineteen B Corps were certified in May 2007. As of May 2018, the B Corp 
community had grown to encompass more than 2,250 companies (See Figure 5.) 
Growth in the number of B Corps has been driven by a few factors. For one thing, B Corps have 
received an increasing amount of media attention (Cao, Gehman, and Grimes 2017). 
Additionally, as industry-leading companies like Patagonia and Ben and Jerry’s have continued 
to renew their B Corp status, they have lent authenticity to the certification. Additionally, the 
passage of benefit corporation legislation in many jurisdictions has conferred social and cultural 
legitimacy on the brand. These factors in combination create a positive feedback loop around B 
Corp certification, and given a decrease in the availability of alternative hybrid forms (Cooney et 
al. 2014), B Corp certification is increasingly becoming a “focal point” for socially minded 
entrepreneurs (Robson 2015). 
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Figure 5. Number of firms certified as B Corps by year 
 
Source: https://data.world/blab/b-corp-impact-data 
 
B Lab has grown in part by tapping into existing communities of social enterprises that enable it 
to expand into new regions. As of 2018, seven B Lab partners were operating in fifty-eight 
countries. These partners included Sistema B in Latin America, B Lab Europe (headquartered in 
the Netherlands), and B Lab East Africa (headquartered in Kenya). Notably, B Lab has limited 
offerings in Asia, with B Corp Asia claiming only eighty B Corporations. 
Almost half (47 percent) of all B Corps are based in the United States, and 82 percent of them 
are based in Western nations. The prominence of this form in Western nations is partly due to the 
absence of B Lab infrastructure in other regions. This regional variance has consequences for 
how the certification is seen and how it fits into the social enterprise landscape. Given that the 
genesis of the social enterprise model can be traced partly to microfinance organizations and 
other commercial organizations in emerging markets, B Corps might be seen as an imperfect fit 
for the model as a whole. 
One non-Western region that has seen a notable growth in B Corp certification is Latin America, 
where the B Lab partner Sistema B has certified 329 B-Corps, including top scorers in both the 
environmental category and the community category. Several notable research papers on social 
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enterprises focus on Latin America (Battilana and Dorado 2010), and some of these papers focus 
specifically on B Corps in that region (Munoz, Cacciotti, and Cohen 2018). 
Within the United States, researchers have found a strong link between the characteristics of a 
state and the density of B Corps in that state. As one might guess, B Corp density is higher in 
states with more-liberal, higher-educated, and more health-conscious populations (Hickman, 
Byrd, and Hickman 2014). The regional context in which a B Corp operates plays a significant 
role in how it uses the certification. For example, the industry-region configuration has a strong 
effect on whether an organization sees value in promoting its B Corp category membership 
through use of the B Corp logo on its products or its web presence (Gehman and Grimes 2017). 
Industry-region configuration also affects the rate at which women-owned businesses choose to 
obtain B Corp certification after passing the assessment (Grimes, Gehman, and Cao 2018). 
B Corps operate predominantly in white-collar and consumer-facing industries, in which the 
value of certification for the purposes of employee recruitment and consumer marketing is 
greatest and in which the assessment process may be easiest to complete and pass. In particular, 
24.1 percent of B Corps are in professional and technical services; 9.4 percent are in financial 
and insurance services; 8.5 percent are in information technology, communication, and 
technology; 9.2 percent are in manufactured goods; 8.4 percent are in retail; and 8 percent are in 
wholesale. 
The Challenge of Measuring Social and Environmental Impacts 
The primary challenge that social enterprises face is to balance the logic of achieving financial 
sustainability with the logic of creating social impact. Tension arises around the uncertainty 
regarding how an organization should weight these two logics. Without a well-defined model of 
governance and operations, hybrid organizations may drift toward either a traditional for-profit 
model or a nonprofit model (Pache and Santos 2010). For example, some socially minded 
founders focus on social values at the expense of operations, causing their firm’s economic 
productivity (and consequently its net social impact) to suffer (Battilana et al. 2015). Others 
experience “mission drift” and reduce or abandon their commitment to social goals over time 
(Pache and Santos 2010). Even with good intentions and an awareness of the challenges they 
face, the leaders of hybrid organizations need to make difficult trade-off decisions. 
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A significant aspect of this challenge concerns the difficulty of measuring social impact. Unlike 
economic value, which can be measured using specific monetary units, social value cannot be so 
easily quantified. This is one reason why the literature on nonprofit impact evaluation remains 
limited (Werker and Ahmed 2008). Another aspect of this challenge is methodological: it is often 
difficult to devise a counterfactual to use in evaluating what would have happened in the absence 
of a nonprofit or of specific nonprofit program. Some academic studies have estimated the effect 
of individual projects through randomized evaluations. For example, evaluations of certain 
projects in Kenya and India found that they improved educational outcomes (Banerjee et al. 
2007; Kremer 2003). Not all randomized evaluations of NGO programs, however, find positive 
outcomes; some of them find that a program has made no difference (Duflo and Kremer 2005). 
Additionally, there is no commonly accepted rate of exchange for comparing social value and 
economic value. Therefore, managers must intuitively decide between maximizing an 
organization’s financial security and increasing its social impact. If the organization is 
considering an investment of current profits in expanding future social value, this decision can 
become even more complicated. 
At the core of B Corp certification is the B Impact Assessment. This assessment aggregates two 
hundred individual questions, each weighted uniquely by B Lab and the Standards Advisory 
Council, a group made up of representative figures from the social enterprise field and academia. 
These entities specify the weighting of each question based on the industry and size of a 
company. Companies that receive 80 points or more are allowed to certify as B Corps. To help 
break down the assessment, B Lab assembles the questions into five categories: Governance, 
Community, Workers, Environment, and Customers. (Table 1 provides B Lab’s description of 
the categories and a sample question from each category.) Because scoring on the assessment 
varies question by question, the categories differ significantly in the distribution of points that 
they allot to companies. 
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Table 1. B Corp Categories17 
 
 Description Sample Question 
Governance The Governance impact area evaluates a company's 
overall mission, ethics, accountability, and 
transparency.  
What portion of your 
management is evaluated in 
writing on their performance 
with regard to corporate 
social environmental targets? 
Community The Community Impact Area evaluates the 
company's community engagement and impact, 
including topics related to diversity, job creation, 
supplier relations, charitable giving/community 
service, and local involvement. In addition, this 
section also includes options for companies whose 
business model is designed to address specific 
community-oriented problems, such workforce 
development for underserved groups, poverty 
alleviation through fair trade supply chains, etc. 
Q: During the last fiscal year, 
how much did your company 
source (in currency term) 
from local, independent 
suppliers? 
Workers The Worker Impact Area evaluates the company's 
contribution to employee well-being, including 
topics related to compensation and benefits, 
training, health and safety, and job flexibility. 
Q: What percentage of full 
time workers were 
reimbursed for continuing 
education opportunities in the 
last fiscal year? 
Environment The Environment Impact Area evaluates a 
company's overall environmental stewardship 
including its facilities, resource use, emissions, and 
(when applicable) its supply chain and distribution 
channels. This section also includes options for 
companies whose product or service is designed to 
address a specific environmental problem, for 
instance by redesigning traditional manufacturing 
practices or by producing products that create 
renewable energy, reduce consumption or waste, 
conserve land or wildlife, or educate about 
environmental problems. 
Q: What  % of energy used is 
from renewable on-site 
energy production for 
corporate facilities?  
 
                                                 
17 Source https://b-lab.uservoice.com/knowledgebase/articles/864318-impact-areas-governance-workers-
community-envi and https://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/frequently-asked-questions/%EF%BB%BF 
Accessed on 02/19/2019 
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Additionally, the B Impact Assessment includes a Disclosure Questionnaire that covers child 
labor violations, adverse regulatory history, use of banned pesticides, and other disqualifying 
characteristics. Notably, points for various areas of performance are weighted according to the 
social value that B Lab and the Standards Advisory Council place on them, not on their difficulty 
of attainment. As a result, companies regard some areas covered by the questionnaire as low-
hanging fruit, and they work to improve performance in those areas in order to catch up to their 
peers (Sharma, Beveridge, and Haigh 2018). 
One issue that often arises in discussions of B Corp certification is whether companies have an 
incentive to surpass the 80-point minimum score. One reason is to qualify for B Lab’s Best for 
the World list, which celebrates companies whose score places them in the top 10 percent of all 
certified B Corps either in their overall ranking or in one of the five categories. Given that B Lab 
and the B Corp model have relatively low brand recognition, it is unlikely that consumers will 
reward higher B Impact scores. However, a score above the 80-point baseline may influence 
investors looking to incorporate the B Impact Assessment into their rating for ESG 
(environmental, social, and governance) performance. More commonly, companies work to 
achieve a higher-than-baseline score as part of an effort to audit and improve internal operations 
(Gehman and Grimes 2017). Researchers have found that an organization’s overall score has a 
limited relationship with its financial success (Chen and Kelly 2015) and with whether a 
company chooses to recertify as a B Corp (Cao et al. 2017). Still, companies often use B Impact 
scores as a way to compare their performance with that of their industry peers. 
Finally, there is the question of whether hybrid social enterprises in general, and B-Corps in 
particular, can advance large-scale change in support the social economy. Beyond merely 
promoting the growth of hybrid models in the marketplace, social enterprises can have an 
outsized impact by influencing other firms in their industries. In a study that focused on a social 
enterprise in the Scandinavian energy market, Sandra Olofsson, Maya Hoveskog, and Fawzi 
Halila (2018) found that social enterprises introduced key practices “that are now standard in the 
industry.” 
Summary 
In conclusion, B Corps are quickly becoming the most prominent hybrid organizational form in 
the United States and are making substantial inroads abroad. B Corps, as we have noted, are a 
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diverse group of organizations that are still seeking legitimacy. The prominence and diversity of 
B Corps makes the B Corp certification process an exciting area of research. 
One of our primary findings relates to the efficacy of B Corps as an eco-label. We identify a 
dilemma at the heart of B Corp certification. Although the broad applicability of the certification 
across industries and regions makes it a promising source of social enterprise research, that 
quality also limits its real-world efficacy as an eco-label. Because of the breadth of the B Impact 
Assessment, B Corp certification does not guarantee any specific outcome beyond an extremely 
general form of positive social impact. In that respect, it differs from FairTrade or LEED 
certification, which guarantees a more specific form of impact. 
Conclusion 
Information disclosure strategies are increasingly used by nonprofits and can be divided into 
three categories based on whether they aim to provide information about product-level 
environmental and social performance, firm-level environmental and social practices, or firm-
level governance. Information disclosure strategies in these three categories bear some 
similarities. They codify, standardize, certify, and communicate (label) information. However, 
there are important differences among these strategies in terms of design quality and 
effectiveness. 
Information Disclosure Strategies and Their Institutional Environment 
As we have discussed, information disclosure strategies are often designed not by nonprofits in 
isolation but rather in coordination with other actors, including firms and government. 
 First, although the focus of this chapter is on nonprofits, it is clear that information disclosure 
strategies do not operate in a political vacuum and that government plays an important role, 
directly or indirectly, in facilitating their emergence. For example, in the case of the CDP 
disclosure process, participation in the program may be more relevant or valuable to firms that 
operate in an environment where climate regulation is more likely. This is consistent with 
research that shows that corporate environmental behavior is strongly influenced by political 
forces—in particular, the perceived threat of regulation (Segerson and Micelli 1998; Maxwell et 
al.2000; Delmas and Terlaak 2001; Kim and Lyon 2011a). Governments also support or endorse 
   
32 
 
NGO certification schemes by, for example, specifying particular schemes (such as FSC or 
FairTrade) in their procurement guidelines (Prag, Lyon, and Russillo 2016). This partly explains 
why about 64 percent of environmental labeling schemes are nominally present in only one 
country and why the diffusion of such schemes varies significantly across the globe 
(Gulbrandsen 2006; Horne 2009; Prag et al. 2016). Further research can identify more 
specifically the elements of the institutional environment that explain this variation. 
Second, although MSC, FSC, and CDP are often described as nonprofits, they are better seen as 
multi-stakeholder organizations that represent actors from the business world, civil society, and, 
to some extent, government (Boström and Hallström 2010). As we discussed with respect to eco-
labels, standard setting that relies on compromise or consensus among a diverse set of 
stakeholders is more likely to be perceived as credible by consumers and more likely to be 
adopted. Yet researchers have raised questions as to how such multistakeholder organizing can 
affect the participation and power of nonprofits (Boström and Hallström 2010). In the same vein, 
the emergence of the B Corporation illustrates that the boundaries between the nonprofit sector 
and the market economy are becoming less clear. This development raises important questions 
about the governance of such hybrid organizational models and about their effectiveness in 
addressing sustainability concerns. 
How Effective Are Information Disclosure Strategies? 
Product eco-labels provide consumers with otherwise unavailable information on a product’s 
environmental sustainability characteristics. By filling this information gap, eco-label schemes 
enable socially and environmentally aware consumers to make informed purchasing decisions 
that help the planet. From a corporate perspective, eco-labels can be a tool to advance strategic 
goals, such as product differentiation, relief from regulatory pressure, and compliance with green 
procurement policies of large retailers and government. However, eco-labels have proliferated in 
recent years and have done so with relatively little quality assurance; although some labels 
achieve widespread recognition, credibility, and demand, others are associated with 
greenwashing, consumer confusion, and compromised product quality (Delmas and Burbano 
2011). Questions linger about whether information disclosure strategies implemented by 
nonprofits can effectively resolve tensions between the demands of the marketplace and the 
pursuit of public good. For example, a decade ago, some scientists criticized MSC for its lack of 
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stringency, claiming that market incentives had led the MSC certification scheme away from its 
original goal and toward the promotion of ever-larger capital-intensive operations (Jacquet et al. 
2010). 
With the rapid growth of eco-label schemes, several questions have arisen. Increased competition 
between eco-labels has led to some confusion for producers and consumers regarding the 
differences between eco-labels and what they all stand for (Delmas and Lessem 2017). In the 
food market, for example, it is unclear whether eco-labels reinforce each other in “greening” that 
market, or whether the existence of competing eco-labels creates confusion that discredits eco-
labels as a whole. More research is needed on what motivates customers to seek green products 
(Delmas and Colgan 2018). Do these “green” consumers occupy a small fringe of the population, 
or do specific attributes of green products make them attractive to a larger population? 
One challenge associated with the study of the empirical effectiveness of information disclosure 
programs involves the difficulty of attributing program-induced changes to agent preferences 
(Blackman and Rivera 2011). Indeed, products offered under the aegis of such programs may 
provide additional quality attributes that complicate this issue. For example, if organic-labeled 
products gain market share, it is difficult to establish whether consumers who buy those products 
are expressing a preference for environmental improvement or for other aspects of product 
quality (such as health, safety, and taste). Do consumers value the public benefit provided by 
green products (reduced environmental impact) or only the private benefit associated with these 
products (improved personal health or higher product quality)? 
We also need to better understand the limitations of information disclosure strategies. Are these 
approaches capable only of capturing a marginal share of consumers, or can they be effective in 
transforming an entire market? Experience to date suggests that even the most widely recognized 
eco-labels capture only about 10 percent to 20 percent of a given market. How can such market 
penetration be leveraged to create wider social change? 
Although information disclosure strategies have grown exponentially in recent years, more 
research on their effectiveness is necessary. When is a policy of shaming laggards more effective 
than one that focuses on rewarding leaders? How does competition between eco-labels affect 
their effectiveness? How severe is the problem of consumer confusion that may result from the 
proliferation of eco-labels? Do information disclosure strategies function as substitutes for 
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traditional regulation or as complements to it? How do these approaches interact? Do standards 
and certification systems simply recognize firms that are already performing well, or do they 
incentivize weaker performers to improve? Although much progress has been made in 
understanding how nonprofits attempt to protect the environment, plenty of opportunities for 
future research remain. 
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